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ABSTRACT
A new, fully IP-centric approach for connecting mission operations to spacecraft is presented in this paper. This
topology provides for standard IP interfaces to be used for payload and flight components. This allows quick
integration and easy reusability of satellite components, specifically lending itself to small satellites and accelerated
mission deployments. From a mission operations point of view, satellite payload components and mission operations
elements become IP end-points in a network. Ground stations become analogous to IP traffic forwarding, routing,
and switching elements. The architecture provides an abstraction to the physical communication channels, routing
communication packets over the internet, through ground stations, and onward to spacecraft. Security is supported
via IP encryption and decryption devices located in the mission operations center. All command messages, including
mission operations commands, as well as payload retransmit requests messages, are encrypted away from the site,
eliminating the need for key exchange protocols and security concerns at remote sites. A real-world demonstration
of this architecture is performed using an existing network of ground stations and on-orbit spacecraft. From a single
mission operations center, these spacecraft have been controlled/flown using a fully network centric approach.
INTRODUCTION
Many traditional LEO satellite communication systems
utilize distinct and customized protocols to provide the
connection amongst satellites, ground stations, and
mission operations centers.
These protocols and
communications networks are often inflexible and do
not lend themselves to scalable and reusable
architectures. In recent years, some satellite
manufactures have moved to a more open approach
whereby the satellites becoming flying IP endpoints.
This creates a model whereby more widespread
networking techniques may be employed to
communicate with these spacecraft.

Figure 1: Examples of IP-based Spacecraft
It should be noted that the onboard devices are
connected to the spacecraft bus via IP, not proprietary
hardware connections. In this way, the IP traffic is not
tightly coupled with a physical layer, as in many
spacecraft. For example, it is possible to send telemetry
traffic from the OBC computer over either S-band or Xband downlinks to the ground. This dissociation
between the traditional physical and higher layers
provides a level of flexibility and redundancy for many
functions of the spacecraft.

SPACECRAFT
The spacecraft currently operated (and to be operated in
the future), are constructed using network-enabled
components connected via industrial-grade switching.
This technique has been proven to be capable of LEO
operations with many of these spacecraft flying for
years, demonstrating the applicability of such
technology. The spacecraft themselves can have a
variable number of these IP-enabled components
onboard, including an on-board computer (OBC) or a
high data-rate recorder (HDR). Several examples of
spacecraft such as these are built by Surrey Satellite
(SSTL). These include the TripleSat constellation,
Faraday test satellites, and Carbonite series of
spacecraft. Some of which are shown in Figure 1.
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CURRENT GROUND ARCHITECTURE
The current architecture employed by the existing
satellite operators consists of two main elements:
•

Ground Station (Antenna)

•

Mission Operation Center (MOC).

Currently, the ground station antenna and the MOC are
almost always collocated, usually due to technological
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limitations. This creates a one-to-one relationship
between a MOC, which flies the spacecraft and the
ground station. This architecture is depicted below in
Figure 2.

Figure 3: Multi Satellite, Multi-Ground Station
Per the diagram, this architecture incorporates a new
element, the Internet, into the design. This enabling
element also creates challenges which are explored in
the later sections.
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Security is always an important topic when considering
the design of a satellite communications network.
Satellites typically provide encryption for the over-theair portion, in order to provide an authentication
mechanism for commanding as well as provide
protection of the downlinked information. In the
existing architecture, a single MOC would contain the
security appliance to provide this encryption. The
colocation of the encryption appliance inside the MOC
provides the physical security that one would desire.

Figure 2: Single Satellite, Single Ground Station
The MOC contains the command/telemetry computers,
encryption devices, and other typical Operation Center
components.
MULTI-SITE & MULTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM
Moving away from an architecture whereby a single
MOC is connected to a single ground station and
operates with a single satellite is obviously useful. The
major uses of such a system are to:
•

Provide greater flexibility and availability in
the execution of existing missions by enabling
a wider range of ground station assets to be
utilized.

•

Enable large constellation missions with
multiple satellites which require many minutes
over many ground stations, all operated by a
single MOC.

In order to enable a large and distributed ground station
network, it is still desirable to maintain the physical
colocation of the security appliance in the MOC.
Placing the encryption device at a potentially
untrustworthy ground station location creates
undesirable security vulnerabilities. In addition, it
creates the need for a key exchange mechanism with
several remote sites. Therefore, a major system design
requirement is for the encryption device to remain at
the centralized MOC. This provides the same level of
protection for the terrestrial portion as the over-the-air
portion. In addition, the IP-based design of the
spacecraft was fully exploited by utilizing standard
IPSEC tunneling as the encryption mechanism.

These requirements drive a separation of the various
components as can be seen in Figure 3. A single MOC
is able to reach several satellites via a network of
ground stations, presumably located throughout the
world.
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COMMUNICATION STACK
The communication stack for the existing design with a
collocated MOC and Ground Station is seen below in
Figure 4.
Moving through the stack, the Operations Computer
generates commands and processes telemetry. These
messages are not encrypted and sent to/from the router.
The router provides both IPSEC encryption/decryption
as well as link-layer (OSI layer 2) processing. The
router is then connected, via a proprietary physical
connection to the modem for physical layer processing.
From the modem, the signal is provided to/from the
antenna for communication with the satellite.

Figure 5: New Communication Stack
The interface type on the boundaries between the MOC
and Ground Station is now at the IP layer, which is a
necessity in order to make use of the Internet.
The incorporation of the link-layer processing into the
modem was accomplished fairly straightforwardly
using modern software-defined radios (SDRs). This
was able to be fully implemented and tested.

Figure 4: Original Communication Stack
There are several issues to overcome in this design if it
is to be decentralized and distributed. The IPSEC
security appliance needs to remain at the MOC. At the
same time, the non-Ethernet based connection between
the router and modem presents a problem with moving
the modem. Therefore, it was decided to incorporate
link-layer functionality into the modem and have the
router only perform IPSEC encryption. The redesigned
communication stack can be seen in Figure 5.
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NETWORKING
Network Connectivity
One requirement of the design of the system was to be
able to communicate with existing spacecraft without
on-orbit reconfiguration. This would allow them to
continue operating with existing, traditional ground
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segments, as well as operated
networked/centralized model.

with

the

new

IP/Ethernet network, the ground stations must provide
some “spoofing” to the same effect.

One of the main network configuration limitations is
that the spacecraft devices all have IP addresses in the
192.168.1.0/23 subnet. The addresses in this subnet are
meant for use on local networks only and are not
Internet-addressable. Now that the traffic is required to
transit the Internet to communicate with the MOC, it is
necessary to somehow encapsulate this traffic and join
multiple locally addressed networks together.

In order to accomplish this, before the pass the ground
station advertises the routes for the upcoming
spacecraft endpoints using open shortest path first
(OSPF) routing protocol. At the end of the pass, the
routes are removed. This allows the spacecraft to
“appear” at different ground stations at different times
and get command packets routed to them. The OSPF
routing protocol traverses the mGRE tunnel back to the
MOC to provide the required routes. This also had the
positive effect that no changes to the mission operations
software were required.

To solve this problem, the multi-point generic routing
encapsulation (mGRE) protocol was employed. This
created a tunnel between the various ground stations
and the MOC whereby 192.168.x.x traffic could freely
flow and be routed between network elements. The
mGRE tunnel is shown below in Figure 6.

SUMMARY AND TESTING
The described network was implemented using several
worldwide Viasat ground stations as well as a MOC at
the SSTL headquarters in Guildford, UK. Several
spacecraft were successfully communicated with, both
in S-band and X-band, including the Carbonite-1,
shown below in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Carbonite-1 Spacecraft
Overall, the project was a technical success and has
created new operational capabilities for the participants
involved. To date, hundreds of passes have been taken
using this technology.

Figure 6: Multi-point Tunneling
The mGRE tunnel was fairly simple to setup as well as
adaptable to future ground stations. A new ground
station can be added as a new endpoints of the tunnel.
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Multi-Satellite Routing
In addition to just network connectivity from MOC to
ground stations, the traffic must also be routed to the
correct spacecraft. With multiple LEO spacecraft and
multiple sites, the command data generated at the MOC
must be sent to the ground station only during the
duration of the LEO pass. This creates a temporally
dynamic nature to the problem. Considering the
spacecraft are not actually connected via a true
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